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1 Introduction 
1.1 Problem Definition and objectives 
 
What used to happen quietly behind closed boardroom doors is now subject 
of considerable public interest: Corporate Governance, a rising star on the 
economic sky.  
 
Over the last decades, the interest on this issue increased tremendously, 
making it the main topic of various discussions especially in the capital 
markets all over the world. Various accounting scandals in big international 
corporations, billions of deficits of important American investment banks in 
2007 and 2008, the presence of excessive manager salaries and the business 
activities’ orientation of shareholder value maximization have created a lot of 
mistrust and doubt about the current organization of the private sector. 
Efficient corporate governance has become the key ingredient of a good 
business management.  
 
Policy makers are now more conscious of the contribution of good corporate 
governance to financial market stability, investment and economic growth. 
Several studies have been conducted, showing that good corporate 
governance practices have led to significant augmentations in economic value 
added of companies, higher productivity, and lower risk of systematic financial 
failures for countries.1 Companies also realize the positive effect good 
corporate governance has on their competitiveness.2 Also investors – 
especially collective investment institutions and pension funds acting in a 
fiduciary capacity – understand the role they have to play in guarding good 
corporate governance, thereby supporting the value of their investments. 
 
                                            
1 ROSC (2005) 
2 OECD (2004), p.3 
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Economies of today show that the interest in corporate governance goes 
beyond that of shareholders in the achievements of individual companies. 
Companies play an essential role in our economies. Private sector institutions 
manage personal savings and secure retirement incomes increasingly 
through the mutual funds industry. That is why good corporate governance is 
important to broad and growing segment of the population. 
 
What is corporate governance? 
 
Like it is with almost all economic issues, it is impossible to find one single 
answer, or one generally accepted definition of corporate governance. 
Depending on the perception of the author and the area of application, 
interpretations differ3 but, basically, it can be seen as a system by which 
business corporations are directed and controlled.4 There are two main 
directions of concepts, the shareholder value and the stakeholder approach. 
Both of them will be presented later on.  
 
The purpose of this exposition is to describe the development and existence 
of corporate governance in the capital markets of Brazil and Russia and to 
analyze how it affected the performance of their stock exchanges. Especially 
in emerging economies where the legal system is often weak and shareholder 
protection very little or not existent, corporate governance becomes more and 
more important. When the legal institutions do not do a good job, the 
corporation has to make some effort at its own.  
 
Giving an example of a new, innovative corporate governance system, we will 
look at Brazil’s Novo Mercado and will analyze how successful it was and still 
is. Despite the limitation to implement certain improvements through 
legislative reform, the Brazilian stock exchange managed to establish a 
system of voluntary compliance with good corporate governance practices. 
What probably would not work out in every emerging country seems to have 
                                            
3 Wentges (2001), p.73-74 
4 Cadbury (1992), p.15; citied in Clarke (2007), p.2 
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been a great success in Brazil. But since every market has its own 
environment and political conditions, the same system cannot be applied 
everywhere. Russia, as we will see, has already made a lot of improvement 
concerning its corporate governance but it still seems hard to implement new 
systems into the capital market. In a country still marked by a powerful 
oligarchy it can be challenging to change the standards. Corporations have to 
be convinced of the benefit they could achieve by altering corporate 
governance requirements.  
 
Before starting with the topic of corporate governance, a short overview of the 
composition of the work will be given to the reader. 
 
1.2 Structure 
 
The first part of the work deals with the term corporate governance in general, 
its origin and development as well as its principles recommended by the 
Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).  
 
In the following section, the Brazilian economy and its capital market are 
described, going more into detail about the São Paulo Stock Exchange and 
how it implemented the Novo Mercado, a listing segment which was 
implemented to increase corporate governance standards at the Brazilian 
stock market. The development before and after this implementation will be 
illustrated. 
 
The next part gives an insight into the Russian economy and the situation at 
its capital markets as well as the corporate governance environment. 
 
Subsequently, the structure and development of the Moscow Interbank 
Currency Exchange, Russia’s most important stock exchange, is explained 
and important results of the last decade are shown. 
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In the fifth part, the Brazilian and the Russian capital markets will be 
compared. We will look at the differences and similarities between them and 
talk about one important question: would an implementation of a special 
corporate governance system like Brazil’s Novo Mercado also work out in the 
Russian capital market? 
 
This topic is continued in the sixth part, where I talk about future prospects 
and recommendations for good corporate behavior in the two emerging 
economies. 
 
In the last part of my work I will give a short a summary about the most 
important aspects of the covered subject and end with my conclusion about 
the issue of corporate governance.  
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2 Corporate Governance 
2.1 Definition 
 
Originally the term corporate governance is derived from ancient Greek and 
Latin: corporate comes from the Latin verb corporare, which means to form 
into one body. Therefore, a corporation is a body or group of people that act 
as one unit. The word governance is derived from the Greek term kybernao, 
which means to steer, to guide, to act as a pilot.5 So literally, the composition 
of the two words means guiding a group of people.  
 
In terms of economic terminology, corporate governance is the process of 
protecting the legitimate interests of stakeholders involved with the corporate 
entities.6 It is related to the relationships among the management, the Board 
of Directors, controlling shareholders, minority shareholders and other 
stakeholders.7 Its primary aim is to create the right incentive to allocate the 
resources to their most efficient uses and to provide transparency and 
accountability of business activities. The challenge is to align the interests of 
individuals, corporations and society as nearly as possible and therefore 
increase trust of all stakeholders. 
 
As mentioned before, there are a lot of different interpretations. Zingales, for 
example, defines corporate governance as the complex set of constraints that 
shape the ex-post bargaining over the quasi-rents generated by a firm.8 
Based on the view of a firm as being a nexus of incomplete contracts, he 
claims that quasi-rents, which are the difference between what two parties of 
a contract generate together and what they could obtain in the marketplace, 
cannot be perfectly allocated ex-ante. Therefore, room for bargaining is 
                                            
5 Clarke (2007), p.1 
6 McGee (2008), S.244 
7 ROSC (2005) 
8 Zingales (1997), p.4 
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created. The role of the corporate governance mechanisms is to set 
conditions for the bargaining so that quasi-rents can be distributed in a right 
way. 
 
Shleifer and Vishny give another interesting interpretation. They understand 
corporate governance as a system that deals with the ways in which suppliers 
of capital to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their 
investment.9 Since they do not control the firm themselves, they depend on 
the performance of the management and underlie the risk of opportunistic 
behavior. This conception is based on the agency problem, which will be 
discussed in the next section. 
 
2.2 Development of corporate governance 
 
Although the idea of corporate governance was known long before the 20th 
century, its necessity was first realized in 1930s, when people during the 
industrial revolution and after the Wall Street Crash of 1929 started to notice 
the deviation between interests of ownership and control. When Berle and 
Mean published their book “The Modern Corporation and Private Property” in 
1932, the discussion about the efficiency of a separation of ownership and 
control started.10 In the following decades after this publication, various 
authors gave a lot of attention to this issue and tried to establish theories and 
explanations.11 Soon corporate governance had become an important 
determinant of the distribution of economic power.12 Today, in the time of an 
international economic crisis, the issue gained tremendous importance again. 
Bad corporate governance practices are blamed a lot for the failure of 
companies.  
                                            
9 Shleifer and Vishny (1997), p.737 
10 Jost (2001), p.79 
11 Holderness, Kroszner and Sheehan (1999), p.435 
12 Morck and Steier (2005), p.32 
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To understand the concept of corporate governance, it is important to be 
familiar with the agency theory, which explains the incentive schemes within 
corporations. The following point will cover this topic. 
 
2.2.1 The Agency Problem 
 
A lot of theories that try to explain corporate governance have its seeds in the 
principal – agent problem. Known as the Agency Theory, its essence is the 
separation of management and finance, or of ownership and control.13 It deals 
with the difficulties that come up under conditions of incomplete and 
asymmetric information between a principal, or stockholder, and an agent, or 
executive. This issue occurs especially in listed stock corporations, where a 
wide distribution of ownership makes it impossible for the shareholders to 
control the company themselves. Professional managers are hired to 
undertake the administration.14 
 
The firm is seen as a nexus of constantly re-negotiated contracts by 
individuals each trying to maximize their own utility. Investors need the 
manager’s specialized human capital to generate returns on their funds.15 
They sign a contract about what to do with the investments and how to divide 
eventual returns. Since they can never cover all possible situations and future 
contingencies due to uncertainty, complete contracts are technologically 
infeasible.16 Therefore, the agent would still have opportunities to act in his 
sole discretion. Managers and financiers have to allocate residual control 
rights to define who makes the ex-post decisions in situations not specified in 
the contract.17 Usually the managers end up with extensive residual control 
rights because the financiers aren’t qualified enough and sometimes even not 
                                            
13 Shleifer and Vishny (1997), p.740 
14 Schadeck (2006), p.6 
15 Alchian and Demsetz (1972); citied in Clarke (2007), p.23 
16 Shleifer and Vishny (1997), p.741 
17 Grossman and Hart (1986), p.716 
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interested in exercising their rights. As a consequence there is a lot of room 
for discretionary allocation of funds for the agent. This has to be limited 
through corporate governance mechanisms. 
 
To assure that the agent acts in the principal’s interests, the principal has to 
control the agent. This comes along with costs, the so-called agency costs.18 
The are three types of agency costs: costs of monitoring by the principal, 
bonding costs by the agent, and the residual loss that arises due to 
divergence between the agent’s decisions and the principal’s interests.19 
Basically, if explaining it with the agency theory, the aim of all corporate 
governance instruments is to reduce those agency costs by creating 
equilibrium of information through more transparency and by giving the 
executives incentives to act in the shareholder’s interest. Its mechanisms are 
ways to deal with the agency problems between managers and shareholders 
and between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. They aim to 
assure that minority shareholders’ rights are not taken away, managers’ 
activities are monitored, and poorly performing CEOs are replaced. 20 
 
Due to national, regional and cultural differences, various approaches to 
business formation and the corresponding structures have evolved different 
corporate governance orientations. The German-Japanese or network-based 
system reflects a stakeholder approach to corporate governance, since 
shareholders do not possess the preeminent position they do in the Anglo-
American or market-based system, which relies primarily on agency theory. 21  
 
The discussion on corporate governance theories has been polarized 
between two main directions: the shareholder perspective and the stakeholder 
perspective. These two contrasting approaches differ in how they understand 
                                            
18 Posch (2008), p.14 
19 Jensen and Meckling (1976), p.6 
20 Gibson (2003), p.233 
21 McCathy, Puffer and Shekshina (2004), p.4 
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and justify essential questions regarding the purpose of the corporation and 
its governance. These concepts will be discussed in the following parts. 
 
2.2.2 The Shareholder value concept 
 
The model of the shareholder value arose in 1986, when Alfred Rappaport 
launched his book Creating Shareholder value. Although Milton Friedman 
already wrote about the idea of the concept much earlier22, Rappaport is still 
said to be its originator. 23  
 
The shareholder value concept is characterized by its concentration on the 
financial success of the company. The only interest of business activities is to 
maximize profits and dividends. It is assumed that the increase in value is 
related to the manager’s effort. The CEOs should only act in the shareholder’s 
interest to get out the highest return possible.24 All operations and investment 
strategies are chosen according to their value propositions to the owners. This 
concept is common in the Anglo – American region but has also been 
observed in many other countries including Australia and New Zealand.25 
 
In this perspective of corporate governance, its task is to discipline the 
management in a way that assures a behavior according to the shareholders’ 
interests.26  
 
Because of its one-sided alignment towards the shareholders, people often 
refuse the “capitalistic” shareholder concept. They claim it to be monocausal 
and extremely shareholder-friendly.27 However, those prejudices are not 
                                            
22 Friedman (1970) 
23 Malik (2008), p.47 
24 Malik (2008), p.139 
25 Clarke (2007), p.129 
26 Wentges (2001), p.86 
27 Schiltknecht (2009), p.31 
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always justified. An analysis of the economic development of the last 200 
years show that the maximization of the shareholder value is the only 
reasonable objective of business activities and that it supports the 
development of new, better products, promotes economic efficiency and 
therefore increases society’s welfare as a whole.28  
 
However, the continued criticism about the side effects of the shareholder 
value approach led to a new approach, which will be presented in the next 
point. 
 
2.2.3 The Stakeholder Approach 
 
The term stakeholder is an analogy to the word shareholder29 and includes 
every person or group that stands in any relationship with the company 
including employees, customers, suppliers, and the community.30  
 
Unlike the shareholder value concept, the stakeholder approach considers the 
interests of not only shareholders but also all participating stakeholders. It is 
built on relationships with a large range of stakeholders, and understands the 
corporate mission as the creation of long-term values for all stakeholders.31 
An important aspect is the social responsibility of the firm, whereby society as 
a whole is a stakeholder.32 The aim of corporate governance from this point of 
view is to ensure that firms are run in such a way that society’s resources are 
used efficiently.33 
 
                                            
28 Schiltknecht (2009), p.35 
29 Wentges (2001), p.93 
30 Monks and Minow (2004), p.50 
31 Clarke (2007), p.9 
32 Chilosi and Damiani (2007), p.2 
33 Allen (2005), p.165 
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The basic difference between the shareholder value model and the 
stakeholder approach is that the latter one considers the interests of all 
groups influenced by the company. So it is not only focused on the financial 
result for the owners, but tries to act in the best-balanced interest of all 
stakeholders.  
 
Since every group has its own interests, it is close to unachievable to consider 
them all. Only one target function can be maximized at the same time.34 This 
“harmony-model” is basically a nice idea, economically, however, - if one 
believes in Malik’s words - a disaster.35 Vinten also claims that the 
stakeholder approach is incompatible with business because of the required 
consideration of everyone.36  
 
But opinions differ. Rivals of the shareholder value concept claim, that a profit 
maximizing strategy imposes various externalities on other stakeholder.37 For 
example, if there were external factors like pollution, then the shareholder 
value concept would decide to only maximize the value of the firm and 
therefore might cause a misallocation of resources. If, however, the 
stakeholder approach were followed, the firm would change and produce only 
the socially optimal level of pollution.38  
 
The discussion of shareholder versus stakeholder approach goes still on and 
there is probably no one right concept. It always depends on the environment 
and also on the branch of business. Following the shareholder value concept 
does not necessarily exclude the possibility to also consider the interests of 
other stakeholders. Profit maximization is not always contrary to social 
responsibility. Sometimes taking externalities into account may actually 
contribute to bigger profits in the long run. 
                                            
34 Posch (2008), p.18 
35 Malik (2008), p.135 
36 Vinten (2001), p.37 
37 Chilosi and Damiani (2007), p.11 
38 Allen (2005), p.165 
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For the future, I think, where business is getting more global and more 
complex, the stakeholder concept will be the better concept. As can be seen 
in the actual crisis also in the USA, the demand for more regulations on the 
financial market is increasing. More regulations result in more stakeholder and 
less shareholder model influences. Or formulated in a different way: the 
stakeholder concept will also be the best model for the shareholders. 
 
The different conceptions vary in aspects of corporate law and have different 
rules determining the framework of corporate life and capital markets.39 
However, the basics of good corporal behavior are the same in many parts of 
the world. The following point talks about the common standards of the 
OECD. 
 
2.3 OECD Principles of corporate governance 
 
In 1999, the ministers of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) endorsed the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance. Since then they have become an international benchmark for 
policy makers, investors, corporations and other stakeholders all over the 
world. They have advanced the corporate governance agenda and provided 
specific guidance for legislative and regulatory initiatives in both OECD and 
non-OECD countries.40 
 
The following principles offer non-binding standards and good practices as 
well as guidance on implementation, which can be modified to the specific 
circumstances of individual countries and regions. 
 
 
 
                                            
39 Chilosi and Damiani (2007), p.2 
40 OECD (2004), p.3 - 25 
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OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
 
 
• Ensuring the Basis for an Effective Corporate Governance 
Framework 
The corporate governance framework should promote transparent and 
efficient markets, be consistent with the rule of law and clearly articulate the 
division of responsibilities among different supervisory, regulatory and 
enforcement authorities. 
 
• The Rights of Shareholders and Key Ownership Functions 
The corporate governance framework should protect and facilitate the 
exercise of shareholders’ rights. 
 
• The Equitable Treatment of Shareholders 
The corporate governance framework should ensure the equitable treatment 
of all shareholders, including minority and foreign shareholders. All 
shareholders should have the opportunity to obtain effective redress for 
violation of their rights. 
 
• The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance 
The corporate governance framework should recognize the rights of 
stakeholders established by law or through mutual agreements and 
encourage active co-operation between corporations and stakeholders in 
creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainability of financially sound enterprises.  
 
• Disclosure and Transparency 
The corporate governance framework should ensure that timely and accurate 
disclosure is made on all material matters regarding the corporation, including 
the financial situation, performance, ownership, and governance of the 
company.   
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• The Responsibilities of the Board 
The corporate governance framework should ensure the strategic guidance of 
the company, the effective monitoring of management by the board, and the 
board’s accountability to the company and the shareholders.   
 
OECD (2004) 
 
 
Since corporate governance typically consists of elements of legislation, 
regulation, self-regulatory arrangements, voluntary commitments and 
business practices that are the results of a country’s specific circumstances, 
history and tradition, their implementation and interpretations vary a lot 
throughout the world. 
 
Corporate governance issues are particularly important in developing and 
emerging economies, since these countries do not have a strong, long-
established financial institution infrastructure to deal with problems concerning 
the direction and control of business corporations.41  
 
Before concentrating on the Brazilian corporate governance and capital 
market, the importance and development of corporate governance in 
emerging countries will be shortly discussed in the following point. 
 
2.4 Corporate Governance in emerging countries 
 
In the twelve years since the Asian crisis, the economic and financial 
landscape in emerging countries has been changed a lot. Countries have 
empowered their financial markets and developed the infrastructure needed to 
promote issuance and investment in long-term, fixed-rate, and domestic-
                                            
41 McGee (2009), p.3 
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currency-denominated debt securities. Capital markets have become more 
liquid and attracted international investors.42  
 
As one can see in Figure 1, the corporate governance quality (CGQ)43 has 
risen a lot since the late 1990s. The crisis in 1997 led to drops of the index 
worldwide, clarifying the need to strengthen corporate governance especially 
in emerging market economies where the damage was intense. The line of 
emerging economies is far beneath the one from advanced economies, but 
increasing constantly since 2001. Latin America made the biggest 
development, rising from the lowest Index in 1997 to even above the 
emerging counties’ average in 2004. As will be shown in part four of the work, 
great progress happened especially in Brazil, probably thanks to the 
implementation of the Novo Mercado in the end of 2000.  
 
Another interesting aspect that can be read from the chart is the fact that the 
higher the CGQ index, the lower is the reaction to economic instabilities. In 
the United States, for example, the Asia crisis didn’t have any affect on the 
index while in Latin America there was a huge drop in the value. Of course 
there might also be other explanations for this reaction but a high corporate 
governance level has certainly a positive influence on the vulnerability to 
financial crisis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
42 Ananchotikul and Eichengreen (2009) 
43 The CGQ Index is measured by three components: the share of the 40 
most important accounting items, a measure of earnings smoothing and a 
measure of stock price synchronicity. For details see Nicolo et al. (2006) 
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Figure 1: Evolution of the corporate governance quality 
Source: own illustration adopted by Ananchotikul, Eichengreen (2009) 
 
 
Being in need of capital and investments, a lot of developing economies 
started to realize that it could be of great advance to bother about good 
corporate governance. Improving it can serve a number of important public 
policy objectives. It makes it easier to obtain capital and helps to increase the 
share price. Some institutional investors have identified corporate governance 
as a main aspect affecting their willingness to invest in an emerging market.44  
 
Furthermore, good corporate governance reinforces property rights, reduces 
transaction costs and the cost of capital, and supports the development of the 
capital market. According to various studies, good corporate governance 
practices also lead to significant increases in economic value added of 
companies and a higher productivity. Also the risk of systematic financial 
failures can be lowered.45 All this advantages can help emerging countries in 
developing their economy. 
 
                                            
44 Gibson (2003), p.231 
45 ROSC (2005) 
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2.4.1 The legal background 
 
The legal tradition is an important factor in strengthening the financial sectors 
and influences the corporate governance significantly. As a result of 
colonization, today, legal traditions of the British law (common law) and the 
French civil law systems are observed in more than 80 percent of the 
countries worldwide.46 Source of law in common-law countries are the 
legislation and the case law whereas in civil-law-countries the statute is 
decisive. Countries following the common law, like India, South Africa or 
Malaysia, show a better protection of investors than civil-law-countries like 
Mexico, Brazil or Japan. Therefore the capital markets and financial sectors 
are better developed and equity financing is more prevalent. As a 
consequence they have far more listed firms and more IPOs per inhabitant.47  
 
2.4.2 Policy reforms 
 
In the last decades, many reforms regarding corporate law have already been 
undertaken in several emerging countries. Reforms such as the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act in 2002, the Cadbury recommendations, and numerous other 
proposals where realized in response to corporate scandals to improve the 
corporate behavior standards.48 Requirements concerning the independence 
of auditors, the role of the audit committee, a minimum of independent 
directors and other rules formulated to protect investors and the public, were 
introduced.49 New structures of the private sector were established through 
the process of privatization and created the need for plenty regulations. In 
Rumania, for example, the privatization was accomplished by a broad 
distribution of free shares. As a consequence, the shareholders didn’t see 
themselves as being the owners, and the companies didn’t see them as 
                                            
46 Capaul (2003), p.5 
47 Leal and De Oliveira (2002), p.23 
48 Hermalin and Weisbach (2006), p.1 
49 Gallagher (2002) 
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investors. The result was a wide expropriation of minority shareholders. 
Continuous complains by shareholders finally led to the implementation of 
new regulations regarding shareholder rights protection.50  
Countries do policy reforms when they notice that something is “wrong”. But 
changing the rules is not enough. The adoption of new systems always comes 
along with different situations that have to be handled. In order to make the 
reform work, it must contain regulations that help the companies to adopt the 
changes without creating new conflicts.  
 
2.4.3 High ownership concentration 
 
When a country is characterized by a high stock concentration and poorly 
developed stock markets as it is, for example, in Latin America or Russia, one 
of the major corporate governance issues is the agency conflict between 
controlling and minority shareholders. Opportunistic behavior of controlling 
shareholders, who only want to maximize their interests, leads to an 
expropriation of minority shareholders.51 In countries where the legal system 
does not do a good job of protecting the rights of shareholders, concentrated 
ownership is more prevalent.52 Therefore, it is even more recommendable for 
firms in those countries to adopt good governance practices.53 International 
investors hesitate to lend money or buy shares in corporations that do not 
subscribe to good corporate governance principles. Transparency, 
independent directors and a separate audit committee are very important. 
Some international investors will not seriously consider investing in a 
company in an emerging country that does not show these standards.54 One 
important implication of this reluctance is that capital markets remain poorly 
developed. 
                                            
50 Capaul (2003), p.5 
51 Rogers, Dami, Ribeiro and Sousa (2007) 
52 Gibson (2003), p.233 
53 Klapper and Love (2004), p.706 
54 McGee and Preobragenskaya (2004), p.1 
  
25 
 
2.4.4 Related party transactions 
 
Under ownership structures of high concentration and complexity, like there is 
in a lot of emerging countries, one family may own listed companies and 
private firms without the relationship of different parts of the business group 
being transparent. Minority shareholders might not even know that the 
controlling shareholder has any connection to the related firm. As a 
consequence capital assets can be used in related party transactions in the 
interest of the controlling shareholder creating a disadvantage for minority 
one. It is important that policymakers create clear rules concerning the 
approval of such transactions. In Chile, for example, the approval process 
already underlies a set of rules to guarantee proper disclosure and enable 
denial if the transaction seems detrimental to a certain amount of 
shareholders.55  
 
2.4.5 Courts vs. regulators 
 
In a lot of emerging countries, courts are under funded, unmotivated, 
overloaded, not familiar with economic issues and sometimes even corrupt. 
There is often a lack of resources. In South Africa, for instance, courts are so 
overburdened that they cannot cope with business cases at all.56 Under 
circumstances like this, an expansion of specialized regulators would be 
useful. Also an independent arbitration panel, like the Brazilian stock 
exchange uses, can be implemented to enforce the corporate law. In both 
cases, the institution should have the right to impose sanctions. 
 
                                            
55 ROSC (2005), p.6 
56 Capaul (2003), p.6 
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2.4.6 Firm-level corporate governance 
 
Another innovative approach is to increase the company’s alternatives and 
incentives for the voluntary implementation of standards and codes of 
corporate governance. The stock exchange of Thailand, for example, tried to 
encourage companies by offering a discount of listing fees to firms that 
implemented corporate governance standards.57 It is also useful to offer 
different levels of corporate governance to choose from. By doing that, 
companies and investors can select the level that seems the most appropriate 
for their own risk profile. This approach enables an unconstrained mechanism 
to increase the corporate governance standards of a country. Brazil and 
Bucharest used this method. Because of the higher evaluation of companies 
performing under a stricter corporate governance level, other companies start 
to improve their practices as well to not be left behind in the competition.  
 
2.4.7 Code of Best Practice 
 
Alternative to legal regulations, which often insist only on basic requirements 
regarding corporate behavior, many countries have implemented so called 
“Codes of Best Practice”. These are national rules that exceed those required 
by law and consist of voluntary principles tailored to the needs of each 
country. Often, they are part of the statute book like it is in Austria, for 
example. It can also be the case that the code is only obligatory for 
companies of a certain size or sector or only for listed companies.  Sometimes 
it is extended by a so-called “comply-or-explain”, or - a little modified - “apply-
or-explain” mechanism. In those cases, companies are “allowed” to act not 
according to the code but when they do so, they have to give a plausible 
explanation why. Countries where this mechanism is common are, for 
instance, Bangladesh58, Uganda59 and South Africa.60 
                                            
57 Capaul (2003), p.8 
58 Siddiqui (2009), p.17 
59 Musaali (2009), p.8 
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In general, changes in the system – no matter through which procedure - are 
always an interminable and complex process and need a lot of patience, 
negotiations and compromises. As we will see now in the example of Brazil, it 
is a tedious procedure but in the end the efforts usually pay off. 
 
                                                                                                                             
60 Mallin (2007), p.251 
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3 Brazil and its economy 
 
Characterized by ample and well-developed agricultural, mining, 
manufacturing, and service sectors, Brazil's economy exceeds that of all other 
South American countries and it is expanding its participation in world 
markets.61 
 
With a population of 198.7 million people, Brazil is the sixth most populous 
country in the world. It is the world's tenth largest economy by purchasing 
power parity.62 Living conditions vary dramatically and also the income 
disparities are significant across the country, between metropolitan centers, 
non-metropolitan urban centers, and rural areas.63 
 
After a long period of state intervention, various regulatory reforms in the 
1990s led to a move towards liberalization and privatization.64 Important steps 
had to be taken in terms of competition policy. Economic openness, 
institutional reforms and the stabilization of inflation allowed by the Real Plan 
(Plano Real) created a more advantageous environment for regulatory 
reform.65 The country wanted to attract investment, initiate further incentives 
for growth, and resolve some of the long lasting deficiencies of public 
provision. Some restrictions on foreign capital were abolished to relieve the 
state from high investment in and high expenditure especially on infrastructure 
industries.  
 
 
 
                                            
61 The World Factbook (2009), www.cia.gov 
62 The World Factbook (2009), www.cia.gov 
63 World Bank Country Study (2004), p.3 
64 OECD (2008), p.11 
65 OECD (2008), p.19 
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3.1 The capital market 
 
The Brazilian capital market is catching up both in terms of size and depth 
with markets in other middle-income countries like Chile or India.66 Since 
structural reforms in 2000, Brazil’s capital market has distinguished itself 
through a uniform processing- and storage-system where stock markets are 
based on division of labor.67 The nine stock exchanges signed an agreement 
to concentrate the trading and listing of publicly held companies on the São 
Paulo Stock Exchange, Brazil’s biggest exchange, while assigning the other 
exchanges with promoting for the financial market in their region.68 On the Rio 
de Janeiro Stock Exchange, the second largest exchange in Brazil, only 
government bonds are traded. The exchanges remained legally independent 
but appear to the outside a one trading center.39 
 
The capital market is characterized by a high ownership concentration. 
Minority shareholder protections are the main issue concerning corporate 
governance in Brazil. Historically, control has been maintained by limiting 
ownership of voting shares to family members only. Today, a predominant 
part of the trading volume is still represented by non-voting shares.69  
 
Brazil’s law traditionally follows the French civil code, which, as mentioned 
before, is known to be the worst regarding investors’ rights protection.70 In 
civil law systems, legal rules are set by legislatures and decisions by courts 
do not corporate into the law. Therefore, it is quite common that conflicting 
judge sentences ignore the jurisprudence. Consequently, if a corporate insider 
finds a way to expropriate outside investors without explicitly breaking the law, 
                                            
66 ROSC (2005), p.1 
67 Hügle (2001), p.218 
68 Santana (2008), p.7 
69 ROSC (2005), p.2 
70 Berghe (2002), p.154 
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he might be able to continue without fear of an unfavorable judicial decree. 71 
Due to Brazil’s poorly developed legal environment, some corporations 
started to act in their own way to get the confidence and trust of investors.  
 
In the context of this exposition, further consideration will only be given to the 
Bovespa, since the main interest of this work is the implementation of its 
corporate governance system. 
 
 
 
                                            
71 Leal and De Oliveira (2002), p.23 
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3.2 BM&F BOVESPA 
 
In May 2008, the São Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa) and the Brazilian 
Mercantile and Futures Exchange (BM&F) merged, creating the new BM&F 
Bovespa.72 Today, the so-called Bolsa de Valores, Mercadorias & Futuros de 
São Paulo is the forth-largest stock exchange of the Americas73 in terms of 
market capitalization, behind NYSE, Nasdaq, and Toronto Stock exchange.74  
 
3.2.1 History 
 
Created in August 1890, Bovespa and other Brazilian exchanges were official 
entities tied to the finance departments of state governance with brokers 
being appointed by the public sector. They were state-owned companies until 
1965, when various reforms turned the Bovespa into a non-profit civil 
association. 75 In 1972, Bovespa was the first stock exchange in Brazil to 
introduce an automated system for the dissemination of information on-line 
and in real time, through a large network of computer terminals. In the 80s, a 
Private Telephone Operations System (SPOT) and an on-line service network 
for brokerage firms were implemented. Bovespa always intended to use 
highly advanced technology to facilitate all operations. In 1997, a new 
electronic trading system called the Mega Bolsa, was launched. Expanding 
the potential information trading volume was only one great benefit from this 
system, which made the Bovespa the most important trading center in the 
Latin American market. Two years later, Bovespa introduced two new 
systems called the Home Broker and After-Market systems, whose aim was to 
                                            
72 www.bmfbovespa.com 
73 Americas are the lands of the Western hemisphere, containing of the 
continents of North and South America with their associated islands and 
regions. 
74 www.world-exchanges.org 
75 Santana (2008), p.5 
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ease the market participation for small and medium-sized investors.76 The 
Home Broker system enables orders to be done directly through the 
brokerage firm’s website on the Internet. The After-Market system offers 
evening electronic trading.  
 
The average performance of the Brazilian stock market is indicated by the 
Bovespa Index, known as Ibovespa. It reflects the variation of Bovespa’s most 
traded stocks. It is the current value, in Brazilian currency, of a theoretical 
stock portfolio constituted in 1968 by a hypothetical investment with a base 
value of 100 points.77 Its aim is to reflect as close as possible the real 
configuration of the cash market operations on Bovespa. 
 
3.2.2 Development until 2000 
 
Due to the economic reforms of the 1990s, Brazil’s capital market has 
received a significant inflow of foreign portfolio investment. During the whole 
first semester of 1997, Brazil’s stock market enjoyed an upward trend with a 
spectacular rise of 93,4 percent within six months. Thanks to the economic 
reforms and the aggressive privatization program Brazil benefited from the 
perceived strengths of its recent stabilization.78 However, the higher level of 
trading volume on Brazil’s stock exchange did not hold up during successive 
crises after mid-1997. 79 
 
The international financial crisis beginning in Asia in 1997 created speculative 
pressures in Latin America and slowed down growth rates in many Latin 
American countries. Brazil suffered from loss in investor confidence and 
shocks to intra-regional trade. Because of Latin America’s dependence on 
                                            
76 De Medeiros (2005), p.2 
77 www.bovespa.com.br/indexi.asp 
78 http://www.cvm.gov.br/ingl/public/publ/artigo2/bocarato.asp 
79 Santana (2008), p.2 
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foreign capital to finance current account deficits, the region was very 
vulnerable to unexpected withdrawals of foreign capital.80 
 
At the end of the 1990s, Brazil’s capital markets were less developed and 
representative of the country’s economy. It was challenged with disastrous 
times. 
 
As seen in the following two charts, Bovespa’s performance was declining. 
 
Trading Volume in USD 
3.966,7 6.940,7
14.782,1
27.081,2
66.360,0
57.024,5
97.510,4
190.657,5
139.583,3
83.771,7
101.537,4
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
  
Figure 2: Bovespa’s annual trading volume in USD millions 
 Source: www.world-exchanges.org 
 
 
Compared to 1997, the total value of shares traded on the Bovespa dropped 
by 56 percent at the end of 1999. The downward movement of the Bovespa 
index also reflects the poor performance in those years. After the crisis in 
1997, the Ibovespa dropped about 35 percent in two years.   
 
 
                                            
80 Langley and Bolling (1999), p.11 
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  Figure 3: Bovespa Index in USD 
Source: www.bovespa.com.br/indexi.asp 
 
Looking at the performance of a stock market, one can interpret the economic 
situation as a whole. In 1997, Brazil had a current account deficit of more than 
$30 billion, or nearly 4 percent of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP).  
 
3.2.3 The problems 
 
During that difficult period, hardly any companies applied to list in the 
exchange. The Brazilian equity market was very weak at that time. Brazil’s 
basic interest rate was, in real terms, the highest in the world.81 Its market 
liquidity has largely been exported to the American exchanges by the late 
1990s. Because of low prices in the secondary market, many controlling 
shareholders removed their companies from the Brazilian market by going 
private.82  
 
                                            
81 Santana (2008), p.16 
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Bovespa became aware of the importance of credibility as a factor in the 
market’s attractiveness.83 It hired a group of experienced professionals, which 
conducted a study to identify how to influence the market’s attractiveness 
positively. Results pointed out the insufficiency of guarantees and protections 
for securities investors. 
 
The legal system in Brazil didn’t really do a great job protecting shareholders’ 
rights. A huge part of shares were given out as preferred shares, which didn’t 
have any voting rights but only the right to receive dividends. As a result, the 
companies were controlled by a small number of holders of voting shares. 
The Brazilian Corporation Law permitted publicly held companies to issue up 
to two-thirds of their capital of shares without voting-right. The majority of the 
remaining third, which in the end was only 17 percent of the stock, was able to 
control the company. In 2002, a legislative reform reduced the proportion 
between the two share types to 50 percent, but only for companies that went 
public after the adoption of this reform. There was still a huge misalignment 
between the interest of controlling and not controlling shareholders. Minority 
shareholders still suffered from unfair treatment and their powerlessness 
concerning the management of the company. 
 
Since the legal environment could not be changed so easily, Bovespa started 
to think in an individual plan to increase its attractiveness. It had to be 
something that did not depend on major reforms or developments on the 
country’s legal corporation structure.  
 
Bovespa decided to establish its own listing rules to strengthen its credibility 
and to create more confidence among investors and companies. Perceived 
risk had to be reduced by generating safer conditions and more rights for all 
shareholders. Furthermore, incentives for companies to list in the stock 
market had to be created. All this could be achieved by a new, better 
corporate governance system. 
                                            
83 Santana (2008), p.8 
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3.2.4 Novo Mercado 
 
In December 2000, Bovespa finally launched its new corporate governance 
instrument: the Novo Mercado (=New Market). It is a special segment of the 
Bovespa available to companies that choose to adopt high standards of 
corporate governance. It contains practices beyond those required by 
Brazilian law. The Novo Mercado was created as an implication of the 
assumption that a reduction in investor perceptions of risk would have a 
positive effect on share values and liquidity.84 Bovespa thought this risk 
reduction could be achieved by offering additional rights and guarantees to 
shareholders and by narrowing the information asymmetry between the 
management and the market participants.  
 
The most important innovation of the Novo Mercado, when compared to the 
legislation of that time, was the ban on the issuance of non-voting shares. It 
was assumed that, by protecting minority shareholders more effectively, 
companies would be able to raise capital at a lower cost. 
 
Additionally, the so-called Market Arbitration Panel was created. It is a 
specialized alternative to the legal system whose aim is to resolve conflicts 
between investors and companies. 
 
3.2.4.1 Listing rules 
 
Bovespa created a series of standards of the behavior of companies, 
managers and controlling shareholders, which were considered as important 
for valuation of shares and other assets issued by the company. Three 
different levels of corporate governance rules where introduced, depending on 
the degree of commitment accepted by the company: Level 1, Level 2 and 
Novo Mercado, the highest level.  
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Companies listed in Level 1 obligated themselves to the following 
transparency and stock dispersion rules:85 
 
• Maintenance of a free-float of at least 25% of the capital; 
• Public offerings have to use mechanisms to favor capital dispersion; 
• Improvement in quarterly reports, including the disclosure of 
consolidated financial statements and special audit revision; 
• Monthly disclosure of trades involving equities issued by the company on 
the part of the controlling shareholders; 
• Disclosure of an annual calendar of corporate events. 
 
To be listed in Level 2, in addition to the obligations of Level 1, the company 
and its controlling shareholders must adopt and observe a much broader 
range of corporate governance practices and minority shareholder rights. The 
balance of rights among controlling and minority stockholders was 
accomplished by the following rules:86 
 
• Establishment of a two-year unified mandate for the entire Board of 
Directors, which must have five members at least, of which at least 20 
percent shall be Independent Members; 
• Disclosure of annual balance sheet according to standards of the US 
GAAP or IFRS; 
• In case majority shareholders sell their stake, same conditions granted to 
them must be extended to common shareholders, while preferred 
shareholders must get, at least, 80% of the value/conditions (tag along); 
• Voting rights granted to preferred shares in circumstances such as 
incorporation, spin-off and merger and approval of contracts between the 
company and other firms of the same holding group, when deliberated at 
general meeting. 
                                            
85 http://www.bovespa.com.br/indexi.asp 
86 http://www.bovespa.com.br/indexi.asp 
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• Obligation to hold a tender offer by the economic value criteria, in case 
of delisting or deregistration process; 
• Admission to the Market Arbitration Panel for resolution of corporate 
disputes. 
 
The Novo Mercado is the highest listing level and contained the strictest 
corporate governance practices. The main difference to the other two levels 
concerns the capital stock. Only common shares (voting shares) were 
allowed. Obligations for publicly held companies listed on Novo Mercado 
are:87 
 
• Public share offerings have to use mechanisms to favor capital 
dispersion and broader retail access. 
• Maintenance of a minimum free float, equivalent to 25% of the capital. 
• Same conditions provided to majority shareholders in the disposal of the 
Company’s Control will have to be extended to all shareholders (Tag 
Along). 
• Establishment of a two-year unified mandate for the entire Board of 
Directors, which must have five members at least, of which at least 20 
percent shall be Independent Members. 
• Disclosure of annual balance sheet, according to standards of the US 
GAAP or IFRS. 
• Improvements in quarterly reports, such as the requirement of 
consolidated financial statements and special audit revision. 
• Obligation to hold a tender offer by the economic value criteria, in case 
of delisting or cancellation of registration as publicly held company. 
• Compliance with disclosure rules in trades involving securities issued by 
the company in the name of controlling shareholders. 
• Some of these obligations must be approved at the General 
Shareholders Meetings and included in the corporate bylaws. 
 
                                            
87 http://www.bovespa.com.br/indexi.asp 
  
39 
The reason to offer different levels of commitment to corporate governance 
was to create alternatives for those companies that have preferred stocks in 
their capital stock but are willing to become more transparent and a provide 
more guarantees to their investors. For many of them, two-thirds of their total 
capital was in preferred stock already outstanding. So obligating themselves 
to the requirements of the Novo Mercado would have meant a drastic change 
linked to high costs. Companies also feared to lose parts of their flexibility if 
committing to Novo Mercado’s standards. That is why Bovespa created 
“softer” levels of corporate governance rules for companies that wanted to 
signal at least some commitment to good corporate governance without 
limiting their flexibility to organize their capital structure. 
 
Companies listed in one of those levels are obligated to follow the listing rules. 
If a company, however, fails to comply the listing regulations, it can be subject 
to fines, suspension of shares from trading, and, in more serious cases, 
cancellation of its registration.  
 
3.2.4.2 Implementation  
 
When the new system was presented in the end of 2000, Bovespa expected 
that mainly new, publicly held companies would list in the new segment 
because of the great amount of now forbidden preferred shares the existing 
companies had. But the plans to go public were delayed because of the bad 
economic conditions of that time. In 2001 Brazil’s economy suffered from a 
domestic energy crisis, the exacerbation of the Argentine crisis and the 
attacks on the World Trade Center in September. The following year was 
marked by the drastic devaluation of the real due to possible major political 
changes in Brazil. 
 
The implementation of the Novo Mercado was a tough time, in which the 
Bovespa had to overcome several challenges. All efforts toward attracting 
new companies didn’t seem to work out. The skepticism among companies 
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was too big. In the first year, no firms were listed on the Novo Mercado or 
Level 2, and there was no single IPO in whole Brazil. 
 
But Bovespa finally got support from important partners. First, the Brazilian 
Institute of Corporate Governance (IBGC) assisted in publicizing and lending 
prestige to the Novo Mercado. Further more, the Brazilian Securities and 
Exchange Commission (CVM), a Brazilian pension fund agency, and the 
Brazilian Development Bank (BNDS) supported it by offering benefits for 
companies listed on the Novo Mercado or Level 2. Also the World Bank and 
the OECD helped to advance the initiative.  
Another supporter of great importance was the National Association of 
Investment Banks (ANBID), who demanded the issuers of offers to be at a 
minimum registered in Level 1. 
 
The Bovespa created the so called Special Corporate Governance Stock 
Index (IGC), which is designed to measure the return of a theoretical portfolio 
composed of shares only of companies that are listed on the Novo Mercado, 
Level 1, or Level 2. The index is calculated in real time, considering the prices 
of the last trades carried out on the cash market up until the moment of 
calculation.  
 
3.2.5 Developments after implementation of the Novo Mercado 
 
One year after the implementation there were 19 companies listed on Level 1, 
representing 14,39 percent of the total volume traded. There was no firm 
listed in Level 2 or Novo Mercado.88  
 
The first IPO on the Novo Mercado since the launch was finally achieved in 
February 2002. By the end of the year, there were two companies in the Novo 
Mercado segment, three in Level 2 and 24 in Level 1. 
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  Figure 4: Number of listed companies89 
Source: www.bovespa.com.br 
 
In 2003, once again, there was no new listing in the Novo Mercado or in Level 
2, but at least some companies have been listed in Level 1. 2004 seemed to 
be the year of breakthrough of the special segments. The number of firms 
listed on the Novo Mercado started increasing constantly.  
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  Figure 5: Bovespa’s trading volume in USD millions 
Source: http://www.world-exchanges.org/ 
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Also the total volume of shares traded on the Bovespa augmented rapidly. 
From 2004 to 2008 it increased by almost 600 percent. The positive 
development of the stock market is closely connected to the economic 
situation. From 2003 to 2007, Brazil ran record trade surpluses and recorded 
its first current account surpluses since 1992.90 
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  Figure 6: Brazil’s Balance of Payments 
Source: www.bcb.gov.br 
 
This successful period was over in 2008. Brazil has not been spared from the 
global financial and economic crisis. Following nearly five years of surpluses, 
Brazil’s current-account balance shifted into deficit in early 2008. Since the 
beginning of the global financial crisis, Brazil's currency and its stock market 
have significantly lost value, -41% for Bovespa for the year ending 30 
December 2008.91  
 
Domestic financial conditions tightened to a large extent and the supply of 
foreign credit to Brazilian enterprises, including exporters, dried up rapidly. 
The cost of domestic borrowing rose sharply, and the real depreciated by over 
40% from the highs of mid-2008 through the end of the year.92 
                                            
90 The World Factbook (2009), www.cia.gov 
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However, tensions were notably lower than those experienced by other large 
emerging-market economies. This was mainly because of the continued 
consolidation of macroeconomic adjustment in Brazil, which started with the 
new policy framework of 1999, combining inflation targeting, a floating 
exchange rate, rules-based fiscal policymaking and wise public-debt 
management. The country achieved a steadily falling inflation rate and public 
indebtedness and thereby reduced external vulnerabilities. This was an 
important requirement to increase the resistance to external shocks and to 
enable economic growth in the long run.93 
 
3.2.6 The present situation 
 
With a total domestic market capitalization of almost 612 billion USD in 
January 2009, the BM&F Bovespa is ranked 13 of the world in this category.94 
In June 2009, 389 companies were listed, accounting for a market 
capitalization of 1.79 trillion BRL. 159 of those companies were listed in one of 
the special corporate governance levels, representing more than 70 percent 
of the total trading volume. Since February, the Bovespa Index has constantly 
risen. However, it is still far away from the historic maximum value in May 
2008, but it is believed that Brazil is already rebounding from the crisis.95  
 
                                            
93 OECD (2009a), p.9 
94 www.world-exchanges.org 
95 Busch (2009) 
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Figure 7: Bovespa Index in USD 
Source: www.bovespa.com.br 
 
The positive development is also shown by the first IPO that was realized 
after the crisis. At the end of June, Visanet went public and is now listed in the 
Novo Mercado segment. Also the Bank of Santander is going to join the São 
Paulo stock exchange this year.  
 
The BM&F Bovespa made its way from an only domestically active, relatively 
unimportant stock exchange to one of the biggest exchanges of the world. It 
managed to get rid of the connection to Brazil’s bad reputation and is now 
enjoying international acceptance and popularity. 
 
 
Now, we will look at Russia, another interesting emerging economy with an 
important capital market. These two countries have some aspects in common 
but, as we will see, initial conditions were diverse and there seems to be no 
“one-size-fits-all” corporate governance. It cannot be consistently applied to a 
country with different structures and has to be adjusted to domestic 
conditions. 
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4 Russia and its economy 
 
Russia is the world’s fifth largest country in terms of geographic area and has 
a population of about 140 million people.96   
 
Poverty and the unemployment rate are declining steadily since more than ten 
years. The middle class is expanding. Russia’s international financial position 
has also improved a lot, showing a positive balance of payments since 2000. 
In the last ten years, foreign exchange reserves increased by almost 588 USD 
billion. In 2008, the GDP growth was 6.0 percent, interrupting ten years of an 
average annual growth of 7 percent, which was achieved ever since the 
financial crisis of 1998.97 
 
Russia has made some process in improving the legal environment but 
corruption, lack of trust in institutions, exchange rate uncertainty and the 
global economic crisis still prevent a lot of investors from providing their 
money. 
 
4.1 Corporate Governance in Russia 
 
In the past decade, corporate governance has become a crucial issue for 
large Russian companies and the country as a whole. Once the government’s 
privatization program began creating publicly owned stock companies in the 
early 1990s, corporate governance was needed to balance the interests of 
shareholders and opportunistic managers. However, seven decades of 
communism and central planning had provided as good as no experience in 
handling issues of ownership and shareholder rights.98 Being a transition 
economy, Russia still had to do a lot of adjustments to become a full 
                                            
96 The World Factbook (2009), www.cia.gov 
97 The World Factbook (2009), www.cia.gov 
98 McCathy, Puffer and Shekshina (2004), p.398 
  
46 
participant in the global business economy of the 21st century.99 The 
necessity of a good corporate governance existed since the early 1990s when 
the country began its development to a market economy, but no infrastructure 
had yet been created to support it. Even though some laws protecting the 
shareholders had been established in the late 1990s, abusing of the rights of 
minority shareholders and foreign investors was still a common happening. 
 
In 2000, government officials and concerned business people realized the 
importance of trust of investors and therefore, standards of good corporate 
conduct. The OECD, the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation, 
the U.S. Commerce and State Departments and many other organizations 
have been encouraging Russian firms to adopt and implement corporate 
codes of conduct and good corporate governance principles.100 Some 
progress had been made in the following years, but it was still not possible to 
accomplish Putin’s goal to be a member of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO).101 Brazil, by contrast, already managed to be admitted in 1995. To 
achieve this, internationally accepted standards of corporate governance must 
be implemented, including disclosure and transparency, generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP), and a lot of other requirements concerning 
trade and commerce.  
 
One problem that is characterizing the scene in the market is the fact that the 
state plays a dominant role in the ownership structures of Russian companies. 
Especially in large companies and banks, the state has strong equity positions 
and therefore a lot of influence. There is a systematic confusion between the 
government’s function as an owner and a regulator. It tends to use its 
influence to support social and strategic objectives rather than to act in the 
interest of shareholder value maximization.102 
                                            
99 McCathy, Puffer and Shekshina (2004), p.4 
100 McGee and Preobragenskaya (2004), p.1  
101 McCathy, Puffer and Shekshina (2004), p.5 
102 Shvyrkov (2008), p.3 
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Change in the Russian attitude regarding transparency and full disclosure is 
happening mostly because of the need for foreign capital. Foreign investors 
are not willing to invest in a company that does not disclose all the important 
financial information. Russian companies found they had to compete for 
capital in international financial markets and that was the impetus for change.  
 
Russian companies were also put under pressure externally. For example, the 
New York Stock Exchange, one of Russia’s main targets for foreign capital, 
has given nonresident companies two years to meet the demands of NYSE 
rules as a condition of having their stock listed on its exchange. One of its 
obligations is to have independent directors on the audit committee. This is an 
important factor an investor looks at when determining whether to invest in a 
Russian company or not. The company is much less attractive as a potential 
investment if those requirements are missing.103  
 
In April 2002, the Russian Institute of Directors (RID) issued the final version 
of its Corporate Governance Code, which contains a list of recommendations 
for best practices including some of the OECD. 
 
4.2 The capital market 
 
Since the transition from a centrally planned economy to a social market 
economy, the economic conditions and also the capital market in Russia 
changed significantly. Currently, Russia is characterized by high economic 
growth and increasing integration in the global markets. Many reforms have 
been implemented and the tax system is fair and transparent. 
 
 
 
                                            
103 McGee and Preobragenskaya (2004), p.5 
  
48 
4.2.1 Development 
 
In the decades prior to the Russian Revolution, capital markets were strong 
and financed Russia’s fast development and expansion to the east. Foreign 
and domestic investors controlled most of natural resources and industrial 
assets. But things changed when the new government took possession of 
Russian assets in 1917. Russia was absent from the worldwide capital 
markets for a long period.104  
 
Finally, in the 1990s, new publicly owned stock companies enabled the return 
to the global capital markets. The pre-revolutionary status was within reach 
and the large publicly traded companies attracted the interest of foreign 
investors once again. Passing more than 70 years basically without 
development in institutional rights and law, Russian securities regulators had 
to make up the leeway to meet the demands of the Western capital markets.  
 
In 1998, the Russian capital market faced many problems. The value of the 
stock market was destroyed and trading went down to almost zero. The 
reason for this crisis was primarily, like in Brazil, the economic consequences 
of the Asia Crisis in that year. Falling energy prices hurt even Russia’s biggest 
companies.105 But the state was able to recover from the insolvency thanks to 
the good development of commodity markets.106 
 
4.2.2 The main players 
 
Today, most of the stock trading in Russia is organized through The Moscow 
Interbank Currency Exchange (MICEX) and the Russian Trading System 
(RTS). Both of them are situated in Moscow, the financial and economic 
center of Russia.  
                                            
104 Goetzmann, Ukhov and Spiegel (2002), pp.7  
105 Goetzmann, Ukhov and Spiegel (2002), p.10 
106 Beck (2009), p.24 
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In the context of this exposition, the focus will be given on the MICEX, since 
its stock exchange is bigger than the one of RTS and therefore the most 
important of Russia.107 
 
4.3 The MICEX Stock Exchange 
 
The MICEX Stock Exchange is part of the Moscow Interbank Currency 
Exchange Group and is in the top 30 list of leading stock exchanges of the 
world. With a total trading volume of shares in 2008 of USD 1985.6 billion108, 
it is Russia’s leading stock exchange. It accounts for over 98 percent of the 
total volume of equities trading on all Russian stock exchanges and over 70 
percent of the global on-exchange volume of Russian securities trading. 
Trading is organized in the electronic form on the base of the modern trading 
system, which is connected to regional trading areas and remote terminals. 109 
 
The MICEX Stock Exchange plays an essential role in helping carry out IPOs 
for Russian issuers. In 2007, 19 companies placed their shares on the 
exchange and raised a total of 26 billion US dollars. This makes the MICEX 
Stock Exchange one of the world’s five largest exchanges.  
 
Key indicator of the Russian stock market is the MICEX Index. Calculated in 
1997, it is one of the oldest Russian stock indices. The MICEX Index is a 
capital-weighted price index of the 30 most important and most liquid shares 
traded at the MICEX Stock Exchange.  
 
 
                                            
107 (More information about RTS available at: http://www.rts.ru/en/) 
108 http://www.micex.com/infocenter/presscenter/features/view/124706 
109 http://www.micex.com/group/profile/portrait 
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4.3.1 History 
 
When the Bank of Russia and leading commercial banks founded MICEX in 
1992, an important step was taken towards the formation of the infrastructure 
of the Russian financial market. The MICEX group contributed a significant 
part to the process of establishment of the Russian market economy. 
 
The short history of the MICEX Stock Exchange began in March 1997, when 
the first stocks were traded. By the end of the first year it had already 50 
stocks from 33 different companies. In 1998, it suffered from the financial 
crisis but the game changed rapidly as Russian investors, above all banks, 
began joyfully investing their money in Russian stocks which were the only 
security with positive real returns for most of the last ten years. Two years 
later, 122 issuers had 174 stocks listed on the MICEX Stock Exchange.  
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  Figure 8: MICEX Index Value 
Source: www.micex.com 
 
Moscow’s unique selling proposition is its geographical location: through the 
big range of time zones its traders can play the markets of New York, London, 
Singapore and Hong Kong all on one day.110 
                                            
110 Aris (2008), p.2 
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4.3.2 Listing requirements 
 
Issuers that want to trade their securities in the MICEX Stock Exchange have 
the options to go, or not to go through a listing procedure. If the latter option is 
chosen, securities are included on the Non-Listed Securities Schedule. This is 
the easiest and quickest way to start trading on the stock market since only a 
minimum of preliminary effort is required and no fees are charged. 111 
 
If the issuer decides to do it through the other way, he has to choose between 
five different quotations, which vary according to their requirements. An 
overview about the differences is given in the following table. 
 
Requirements A1 A2 B V112 I112,113 
 
Shares 
 
     
Common stock ratio of an individual and 
his affiliates (max)   75% 75% 90% - - 
Capitalization of 
shares, rubles 
(min) 
ordinary 10bil 3 bil 1,5 bil - 60mil 
privileged 3bil 1 bil 500mil - 25mil 
Financial accounting 
IAS / 
US 
GAAP 
IAS / 
US 
GAAP 
- - - 
      
 
Corporate Conduct 
 
     
Board of independent directors 3 3 1 1 1 
Auditing Committee + + + + - 
Obligation to disclose information about 
the issuer’s holdings and securities 
transactions 
+ + + + + 
Confirmation of document regarding 
usage of relevant internal information + + + + + 
  Table 1: MICEX Listing requirements 
Source: www.micex.com 
                                            
111 www.micex.com 
112 For capital issues, for the first time placed on the stock exchange through 
public subscription or over the counter 
113 Availability of Authorized Financial Consultants 
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Quotation Lists V and I are intended for those securities placed for the first 
time by way of initial public offering at the stock exchange via a broker 
organizing the placement. 
 
As can be seen in the table, quotations A1 and A2 have the strictest 
requirements. Only companies listed in that list are obligated to make their 
accounting after standards of US GAAP or IAS. Different to the Novo Mercado 
requirements, here in the highest level it is still allowed to issue 30 percent of 
the capital in form of preferred shares. This is impossible in Bovespa’s highest 
listing. On the other hand, for List A1 and A2, it is obligated to have three 
independent members in the board of directors while in Brazil’s special 
segments only one is needed.  
 
Quantity of Securities* traded on MICEX SE
167
29
177
20 1
594
97
24
159
10 1
462
A1 A2 B V I NLSS**
Issues Issuers
 
Figure 9: Quantity of securities traded on MICEX Stock Exchange114 
Source: www.micex.com;  
*Equities and Bonds, **Non-listed securities schedule 
 
 
Figure 9 shows the quantities of securities traded on MICEX SE and their 
distribution within the different quotation lists. As can be seen, by far most of 
the companies offer their securities for trade without going through the listing 
                                            
114 as of the 1st of July, 2009 
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procedure. By doing that they save not only time (10-20 days less), but also a 
lot of money since the inclusion on one of the quotation lists costs between 
105,000 and 265,000 rubles. The most common quotation list chosen by 
companies going through the listing procedure is List B, where only one 
independent director is required and accounting does not have to be done by 
IAS or US Gaap standards. 
 
4.3.3 Recent development 
 
Recently, the Russian stock market was suffering from investor concerns over 
the Russia-Georgia conflict, corporate governance issues, and the global 
economic crisis, resulting in a fall of almost 70 percent. Also Russia’s banking 
system suffered from liquidity problems and needed financial help from the 
State.115 It was and still is a challenge for policy-makers to manage the 
consequences of the economic recession and limit its severity and 
duration.116 
 
 
MICEX Index
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
0
9
.0
1
.0
8
0
9
.0
2
.0
8
0
9
.0
3
.0
8
0
9
.0
4
.0
8
0
9
.0
5
.0
8
0
9
.0
6
.0
8
0
9
.0
7
.0
8
0
9
.0
8
.0
8
0
9
.0
9
.0
8
0
9
.1
0
.0
8
0
9
.1
1
.0
8
0
9
.1
2
.0
8
0
9
.0
1
.0
9
0
9
.0
2
.0
9
0
9
.0
3
.0
9
0
9
.0
4
.0
9
0
9
.0
5
.0
9
0
9
.0
6
.0
9
0
9
.0
7
.0
9
0
9
.0
8
.0
9
 
  Figure 10: MICEX Index Value in the crisis 
Source: www.micex.com 
                                            
115 The World Factbook (2009), www.cia.gov 
116 OECD (2009b), p. 19 
Global financial crisis 
reached Russia 
 
Russia-Georgia conflict 
  
54 
The negative financial trends in 2008 were a test for the governance 
mechanisms of many corporations. The remaining weaknesses in legal and 
regulatory infrastructure were highlighted once more.117 But, looking at the 
trend of the MICEX Index, it seems that the toughest time is already left 
behind. Since the beginning of the year, Russia’s leading index already 
increased by more than 75 percent.  
 
However, there is still a lot of improvement to do not only in the capital market 
but also in the Russian economy as a whole. The country has a short history 
in separating ownership from management. Introducing professional 
management structures and effective governance mechanisms is difficult but 
getting more popular.118 Russia is also still tailing the effectiveness of the 
regulatory infrastructure of most of the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, 
China). Only 24 out of more than 300 public companies are affected by the 
governance regulation. In Brazil on the other hand, about 25 percent of the 
top-listed companies are directly affected.119 The federal Service for 
Securities Markets (FSFM) has the core regulatory function. It recommended 
the Corporate Governance Code to all public companies. Still, because of the 
voluntary nature, the influence is quite little. Transparency, for example, is 
improving but the movement towards internationally accepted, obligatory 
accounting standards like IFRS or U.S. GAAP is much slower than in Brazil or 
India. It is only seen in very large companies who use it to improve their 
access to capital. 
 
The limited role of financial markets and extensive government participation in 
equity of large firms remain a major barrier on the road towards economic 
stability and international leadership.  
 
Even though the Russian stock exchange is much bigger than the Brazilian 
one in terms of volume of traded shares (see Table 2), it is still weaker and 
                                            
117 Shvyrkov (2008), p. 2 
118 Shvykrov (2008), p.3 
119 Shvyrkov (2008), p.10 
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more vulnerable in times of crisis. In the following part we will compare their 
development during the last years and analyze their possibilities of 
improvement. 
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5 Comparing the Brazilian and the Russian capital market 
 
By now, we have heard a lot about the Brazilian and the Russian capital 
market, their history, development, and corporate governance. What is now of 
interest is to look at the differences and similarities between them to analyze 
the possibility of improvement regarding their corporate behavior and, as a 
consequence, their efficiency and international success. Even though both of 
them are emerging economies and they have some economic aspects in 
common, the basic beliefs and initial conditions are quite different.  
 
Brazil made the business case implementing a new governance system into 
the stock market in a country where the legal regulations do not really offer 
the best conditions to attract foreign investors. It came up with the innovative 
idea to implement their own system and its efforts showed success. After 
some initial difficulties the system was accepted and companies started to 
voluntary obligate themselves to higher corporate governance standards. The 
benefits coming along with them attracted more and more firms. Thanks to the 
Novo Mercado, Brazil’s stock exchange managed to sustain its position within 
international capital markets.  
 
The question now is if the same idea would also work out in the Russian 
capital market? Would the implementation of a “новые рынки”120 create the 
same positive progress? 
 
Some corporate governance improvement has already been achieved but the 
corporate responsibility has not quite reached the level of Brazil. Probably 
because of Russia’s short history as a market economy, making a change in 
its business mentality appears a big challenge. The country has not had the 
same time as other emerging economies to develop its marketability and to 
make similar experiences to learn from. If the MICEX would implement a new, 
stricter corporate governance listing system, it would probably encounter 
                                            
120 (New Market) 
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resistance of several stock exchange giants that fear the need of cost-
intensive changes. 
 
Whether an innovation like the Novo Mercado would be prosperous in Russia 
is a hard question to answer. Before trying so, let’s have a look at what 
distinguishes BM&F Bovespa and MICEX Stock Exchange from each other. 
 
5.1 International comparison 
 
Looking at their position in the international capital market, both of the two 
stock exchanges are within the top 20 worldwide in terms of volume of shares 
traded.  
 
Stock Exchange Volume of traded Stocks, USD mil Stock Exchange 
Volume of traded 
Stocks, USD mil 
NASDAQ OMX 36.446.548,5 Hong Kong Exchanges 1.629.782,3 
NYSE Euronext (US) 33.638.937,0 SIX Swiss Exchange 1.500.366,5 
London SE 6.271.520,6 Borsa Italiana 1.499.456,5 
Tokyo SE 5.607.321,9 Korea Exchange 1.432.479,9 
Deutsche Börse 4.678.829,0 NASDAQ OMX
 
Nordic Exchange 1.338.181,1 
NYSE Euronext 
(Europe) 4.411.248,7 Shenzhen SE 1.248.721,8 
Shanghai SE 2.600.208,6 Australian SE 1.213.239,6 
BME Spanish 
Exchanges 2.410.721,2 Taiwan SE Corp. 829.612,2 
MICEX 1.985.600,0 National Stock Exchange India 725.398,7 
TSX Group 1.716.228,0 BM&FBOVESPA 724.199,2 
 
Table 2: Top 20 Stock Exchanges worldwide121 
Source: www.world-exchanges.org 
 
Apart from that, both of them are the most successful in their region and 
rapidly climbed the ladder of development regarding their infrastructure and 
                                            
121 as of July 2009 
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competitive position. Among the emerging countries, together with India and 
China, they are the biggest and fastest growing economies accounting 
already for 15 percent of the world’s GDP and 40 percent of the world’s 
population – upward trend.  
 
In the following points we will look at interesting aspects that could be related 
to their corporate governance and its development. Let’s start with their 
present condition. 
 
5.2 Corporate Governance standards 
 
Clearly, Bovespa is the winner when it comes to corporate governance 
standards used so far. Through the implementation of the new segments it 
could raise their standards significantly and made good corporal behavior a 
commonly expected condition within listed companies. Investors became 
more aware of their rights and expect corporations to act according to their 
code of conduct. Minority shareholders feel more secure and, as a 
consequence of having more rights, feel more invited to participate into the 
firm’s activities. Thanks to the arbitration panel, help is provided if there 
should be a conflict. Issues concerning the capital market do not longer 
depend only on legal regulations. As a whole, the stock exchange is 
organized better and more effective and a lot more transparent then before 
the implementation.  
 
In Russia, on the other hand, even though some progress has been made, 
there is still a lot of work to do. Preferred shares are still very frequent, leaving 
their shareholders with a worse condition compared to the owners of common 
shares. Further more, there is still not enough protection of minority 
shareholders. Also transparency standards cannot be compared to those of 
Brazil. It is not without reason that Russia is still not member of the WTO. 
However, the MICEX Stock Exchange showed initiative to improve the 
situation: in 2007, together with Interfax it launched a joint corporate 
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information disclosure project with the aim to expand the range of information 
services offered to market participators, to create better channels for the 
disclosure of information about listed companies and to improve the 
awareness of investors about IPOs.122  
In the same year, a new specialized exchange sector of innovative and 
growing companies (IGC) was launched to help small and medium-sized, fast 
growing innovation companies to attract investors and to create conditions 
that facilitate IPOs. This sector has stricter requirements concerning 
information disclosure. Companies in this sector have to disclose detailed 
information about their economic activity and provide a corporate calendar 
showing dates of their main events. 
 
5.3 Market concentration 
 
An important aspect differentiating the MICEX Stock Exchange from its 
Brazilian competitor is the high market concentration of its ten most traded 
domestic companies. The ten biggest blue chips, like Gazprom, Rostelecom 
or Rosneft, make up more than 90 percent of the whole market 
capitalization.123 Companies of this dimension are very powerful and have a 
lot of influence into the economic happening. For this reason it is difficult to 
implement new systems if those companies won’t agree.  
 
Bovespa’s top ten companies, on the contrary, only contribute half of the 
market capitalization. Therefore, power is not that concentrated and getting a 
lot of small companies to change their standards can convince others to come 
along because of their need to stay competitive.  
 
Firms of the size and importance like on the Russian stock exchange do not 
have a lot to fear because they are market leaders anyways. Apart from that, 
their power is closely connected to politics, which sometimes can also be a 
                                            
122 http://www.interfax.com/12/296007/press.aspx 
123 www.micex.com 
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disadvantage as it was in the case of Yukos. Mikhail Khodorkovsky, CEO of 
Yukos, Russia’s former largest oil producer, was invited to the Kremlin and 
publicly complained about corruption, abuse of authority and unfair tactics 
used by the public oil company Rosneft, which was Yukos’ competitor and 
was said to have close connections to the Kremlin. A few months later he 
found himself in prison, officially because of defraudation of tax. Opinions 
about the real reason differ. Strangely enough, in 2005, Rosneft took over 
Yukos.124 This is the best example for illustrating the Russian system of 
power. It is hard to understand and analyze the internal mechanisms as an 
outsider but apparently there is more behind it than meets the eye. The state 
has a lot of influence into the economy and especially the financial market. To 
implement new ideas, one has to convince also its opponents and the state. 
Otherwise there is little chance to make a difference. 
 
5.4 Development 
 
The initial conditions of Brazil’s and Russia’s capital markets varied a lot. 
Brazil was characterized through a high dependence of foreign investors while 
most of Russia’s capital was provided domestically. Bovespa was forced to 
make a change after it suffered so much from the consequences of the Asian 
crisis. That is why it came up with the idea of Novo Mercado: it was the need 
of foreign capital and of better corporate governance demanded by investors 
that made it implement a new system.  
 
Having the world’s largest reserves of mineral and energy resources, Russia - 
on the other hand - didn’t depend so much on external investments. Until now 
it didn’t really feel the necessary to align itself to international standards. Its 
own rules and system seemed to be enough and worked out for Russia’s 
companies as well as investors. 
 
                                            
124 www.corporateconflicts.com/archives-yukos.html 
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During the last six years, as can be seen in Figure 11, the two stock 
exchanges went through a similar development. Being an indicator not only 
for the performance of the stocks but also for the country’s economy as a 
whole, one can read the chart like an economic history book. In 2004 the 
MICEX Index only grew by 4 percent per annum because of negative 
developments during the “Yukos crisis”. A huge fall in the Yukos stock 
consequently influenced all Russian stock exchanges as well as their indices. 
Changes in the oil price had influences in exchanges worldwide. 
 
The annual growth rate was rising after the drop in 2004 and then sharply 
dropped again in 2008, when the international financial crisis resulted in 
several exchange crashes all over the world. Both the positive and negative 
movements were especially intense in the Russian capital market. One 
possible explanation for this is the trend of high willingness of Russian 
investors to carry a risk. More risk is connected to higher possible gains. 
Therefore, in a successful or lucky period, the value rises a lot, while in 
problematic times the high risk may result in large falls or even crashes. 
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Figure 11: Annual growth rates of Indices; *until August 2009  
  Source: www.bovespa.com.br, www.micex.com 
 
The index with the least average movements in value is the index of 
Bovespa’s special segments, illustrated by the red line. From 2004 to 2007, it 
almost constantly rose by approximately 40 percent. Once again, it shows that 
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good corporate governance makes a company’s stock less vulnerable to 
external influences. Stocks included in the IGC Index in average grow a little 
more steadily over time than those of the Ibovespa. After the drop in 2008 
they developed about the same. 
 
Figure 12 shows the number of initial public offerings of the last six years. 
After initial difficulties with the implementation of the new corporate 
governance system on Bovespa, the amount of IPOs increased rapidly from 
2004 to 2007. MICEX couldn’t keep up with the Brazilian stock exchange, 
neither in number of IPOs nor in the raised capital. Most of the IPOs issued on 
the Bovespa were realized in the Novo Mercado. Of course, it is hard to make 
assumptions about what would have happened without the implementation of 
the new segment, but probably the total amount of IPOs would be less. The 
new corporate governance system motivated companies to go public that 
without the system probably would have not. It offered them a good reputation 
to provide to their investors. The decisive argument was the higher attraction 
of new investors that are more willing to invest because of better conditions of 
transparency and protection.  
  
  Figure 12: Number of IPOs realized on MICEX and Bovespa 
Source: www.bovespa.com.br, www.micex.com 
 
2006 was the only year when the volume of capital raised through IPOs of 
MICEX exceeded the amount of Bovespa, even though the number of IPOs 
was much lesser. This was achieved thanks to the huge public offering of 
# of IPOs
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
MICEX BOVESPA
  
63 
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Rosneft with a total amount of almost 10,5 billion US dollars.  On the 
Bovespa, for comparison, an IPO raises about 300 million US dollars on 
average. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Volume of capital raised through IPOs 
Source: www.bovespa.com.br, www.micex.com 
 
 
In 2008, there was no IPO on MICEX Stock Exchange. However, it could 
raise about 2,4 billion US dollars from seven secondary public offerings 
(SPOs; also follow-on offering), which is the offering of shares by holders of 
registered stock to the open market. 
 
5.5 Behavior during the crisis  
 
The international financial crisis led to changes in the behavior of investors 
and companies. They were more cautious and less willing to take risks. But in 
Russia, it seems that investors already lost their fear. Rich Russians appear 
to be increasingly losing interest in Swiss bank accounts and dollar assets. 
Instead, they invest their rubles more in Russia itself, where all the risk, but 
also one's chances of winning are rated higher. 
Maybe that is why the MICEX Index always has the most distinctive 
movements. 
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Monthly growth rates 2008/09
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Figure 14: Monthly growth rates 2008/09 
Source: www.bovespa.com.br, www.micex.com 
 
Comparing the development of the Brazilian Index Ibovespa, the index of the 
special corporate governance segment IGC, and the MICEX index, one can 
clearly see that the Russian Index (illustrated by the yellow line) changed the 
most during the last one and a half years.  
 
Depending highly on the oil price, Russia’s economy was affected a little later 
than Brazil. Oil prices remained high until the second half of 2008 and then fell 
harshly, creating great pressure on the ruble and on public finances. From 
July 2008 to January 2009, the Russian stock index MICEX stock lost 58 
percent and the ruble fell by 34 percent in value against the US dollar. But it 
seems that one year after the bankruptcy of U.S. investment bank Lehman 
Brothers, investors are willing to take risks again. Since the beginning of the 
year, the MICEX Index has risen by 87 percent, showing the fourth-best 
performance among the world's major stock exchanges. Also other stock 
exchanges in emerging markets recorded extreme profits: the Ibovespa has 
risen by 54.22 percent, Indonesia's Jakarta Composite even by almost 78 
percent.125 The two Brazilian indices had a similar development without 
significant differences, with the IGC averagely always running slightly above 
                                            
125 Financial Times Deutschland (2009) 
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the Ibovespa. Since the difference in the monthly growth rates is so small, it is 
not really possible to say if the higher corporate governance level was able to 
limit the damage of the crisis better to companies of one of the special 
segments. 
 
5.6 Russian Novo Mercado? 
 
Coming back to the central question whether the implementation of a “new 
market” like in Brazil would work out in the Russian stock exchange, my 
answer would be yes and no, it depends on the point of view. It needs 
differentiation to answer the question.  
 
In a broader sense I would say yes, because I think that generally the idea of 
the concept works for every emerging but also developed country. The idea of 
improving the corporate governance situation is the background of many 
different policy reforms that were already implemented all over the world. The 
objective is to create a safer environment that guarantees the consideration of 
the interests of all relevant stakeholders.  
 
But, on the other hand, this objective cannot be realized through the same 
mechanisms everywhere. That is why my answer is no from this side of view. 
Every country has its own, certain structures and official and unofficial rules 
determining the economic happening. This is especially true for Russia. There 
are certain, commonly known rules of “best practice”. Rules that concern the 
respect for powerful companies and people, like an unofficial list of “don’ts” 
that have to be respected in order not to be expelled from the scenario. I do 
not think that a Novo Mercado in Russia would show the same success like in 
its Latin American opponent. In Brazil, the implementation met with a lot of 
criticism. Companies were very skeptical and it needed a lot of time, patience, 
hard work and support from many influential institutions to convince market 
participants to step away from the traditional system. I think that procedure 
would be even more difficult in a country like Russia, where a few powerful 
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oligarchs set the tone in the business life. For example, only accepting 
common shares seems impossible in the Russian Stock Exchange, at least at 
the moment, because a huge amount of capital is hold in preferred shares. 
Apart from that, it does not seem to me that they have the incentive to do it 
neither. I think many Russian minority shareholders do not even try to 
complain because they do not see the sense of their effort, assuming that it 
would not make a difference anyways. Improving the corporate governance 
has to be done through other reforms first. The probably most important 
change would be the establishment of an independent regulator. 
Implementing new rules does not make sense if there is no institution to 
control the application. Step by step it can then continue with other 
instruments like higher transparency requirements, especially for inter-
corporate relations, and recognition of rights of stakeholders. Put it into other 
words, Russia needs its own version of a Novo Mercado to jointly create 
wealth, jobs, and the sustainability of successful corporations.  
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6 Future prospects and recommendations 
 
For the future, I would say there is definitely a visible trend towards higher 
requirements in corporate governance, more regulations and a tighter network 
between shareholders, the management, employees and the society. The 
corporate social responsibility will be getting more important and companies 
will have to adjust their activities to the interest of all stakeholders.  
 
I think Brazil is on a good way of getting there. Its rising awareness of the 
importance of good corporate governance will attract more and more foreign 
investors. This will further develop the country’s infrastructure and let Brazil 
and the Bovespa climb the ladder of international capital markets until they 
can directly compete with developed economies. The Novo Mercado will be 
the new standard and corporations will realize that a listing in another 
segment is of disadvantage for them. Investors won’t accept lower conditions 
any more because there are getting more confident and demanding 
concerning their rights and possibilities.  
I believe that also the legal environment will improve. Of course it needs more 
time to change the law but various reforms will lead there step by step. I see a 
great potential not only in Brazil’s capital markets but also for the country as a 
whole.  
 
Russia’s development, on the other hand, depends a lot on its further policy 
reforms. Being already an energy superpower, it has all the potential to 
become the most powerful economy of the world. But it must recognize that 
there is still a lot of work to do and that it lags behind other emerging 
economies when it comes to infrastructure, regulation, justice and 
transparency. If it wants to keep or even improve its international position, 
MICEX should strengthen its corporate governance and take demands of 
foreign investors into consideration.  
If MICEX manages to implement higher corporate governance standards, the 
potential of improvement in its performance is enormous. It could attract 
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capital on a more international level. Right now, there are hardly any foreign 
companies listed. If the stock exchange would provide better conditions for 
companies and investors in terms of protection, regulation and transparency, 
than MICEX could raise its market capitalization and number of IPOs a lot.  If 
it fails to do so, however, MICEX Stock Exchange would probably face a drop 
in its performance in the long run.  
 
As mentioned before, I think another important aspect is MICEX’s need to 
establish a regulator to settle corporate and stock market disputes like it was 
done in Brazil’s Bovespa. Because of the bad legal environment, MICEX has 
to take care of conflicts itself. It has to guarantee to its stakeholders that a 
behavior according to the rules is being controlled, disputes being arbitrated 
and misbehavior sanctioned, especially in cases where the legal structure 
would fail to provide help. Concerning this, the MICEX already made a step 
into the right direction this year. Recently it signed a cooperation agreement 
with the Government of the Republic of Mordovia in order to develop the 
innovation and investment market at MICEX and to attract investments to 
innovative companies of Mordovia. Legal and informational–analytical 
assistance is provided to support the investors. There were also introduced 
proposals for improving the legislative environment for Russian innovative 
infrastructure development.126  
 
In general, I see two important challenges or opportunities of improvement for 
Russia: first, it should try to diversify its economy rather than rely on the 
energy sector. It wants to reduce its debt ratio by altering exports. But 
depending so much on the oil prices makes it weak during recession. 
Although there is a positive trend seen in the development of the oil price, one 
can never be sure what will happen in the future. It only needs one drastic 
event somewhere in the world to affect the price in Russia (like it was the 
case with the attack on the World Trade Center of Sept. 11th). And as we have 
seen many times, changes in the oil price also influence the market 
performance as a whole.  
                                            
126 www.micex.com 
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The second opportunity is also related to Russia’s natural resources. Having 
such a huge amount of raw materials, Russia should use this advantage not 
only by exporting them but also by manufacturing products itself. To 
participate in more than just on stage of the supply chain could create a lot of 
added value for the country. Russia would probably have to contract foreign 
partners to obtain the necessary know-how and investments but establishing 
this multinational network could also be of great advantage for the economy. 
 
It is essential to further develop the Russian capital market, because a 
consistent and highly capitalized financial infrastructure will enable the 
reduction of risk in Russia’s economy. Like Alexey Rybnikov, CEO of the 
MICEX Stock Exchange, said: “Turning Moscow into an international financial 
center is a big ambition, but a healthy and achievable one.”127 
 
 
                                            
127 www.micex.com 
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7 Summary and conclusion  
 
Corporate governance has reached a new level of importance within capital 
markets all over the world. Several reforms have increased its awareness and 
have led to improvements in infrastructure, legal systems and transparency. 
But there is still a lot of effort to make to create a sustainable system of 
corporate governance. The financial crisis has shown that a lot of countries 
have to rethink their strategy and policy in order to be less vulnerable. It is not 
longer enough to only think about the maximization of economic value. The 
need of a long-run sustainability is getting bigger and, at the same time, 
creates a new factor of risk. Corporations have to consider the wealth of more 
than just one type of shareholders and have to take all possible outcomes of 
their action into account. The simple shareholder value concept is out of date 
and does not represent the objective of a modern company any more. It 
became inevitable to take the interest of other stakeholders into account when 
making decisions. The awareness of the right to be treated fairly has opened 
the mind of shareholders and led to a revolution in shareholder protection. 
Mechanisms to respond to the corporate responsibilities have to be created. 
Corporate governance is not only about dealing with the relationship between 
ownership and management anymore, it became crucial to defend one’s 
position in the economic environment. It became part of the company’s 
strategy, using it to reduce risk, improve its reputation and attract investors. 
Especially for emerging economies it is a good method to improve the 
conditions for starting to trade internationally. 
 
Brazil’s Bovespa realized the importance of good corporate behavior and 
found an innovative way to implement it into its system. Even though it had a 
difficult start, Bovespa managed to convince its market participants of the 
advantages of the Novo Mercado. It showed them that the high costs of 
issuing stocks in the new segment are a low price for what you get in the end: 
security, competitiveness, and the confidence that despite acting in a country 
of poverty and corruption there is a way to leave this image behind and to 
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keep up with developed economies. It gives companies the chance to 
compete on an international level. To make the structural changes easier, it 
established three listing segments that vary according to their degree of 
corporate governance requirements. Companies have the possibility to 
choose the level that matches the best with their intention and structural 
framework. Starting with the listing in the lowest level, companies do not have 
to adopt all changes at once but can still show their intention of improvement. 
Later on, whenever they feel ready for the next wave of changes, the firm can 
climb to the next level. By offering this possibility, Bovespa could improve its 
corporate governance standards gradually. 
After a few years, initial difficulties were overcome and the amount of IPOs 
increased constantly, above all in the Novo Mercado level. The drop in 
performance last year wasn’t as crucial as initially feared and Brazil was one 
of the first countries to leave the crisis behind, showing already a positive 
development in the last few months. It gained a lot of popularity thanks to the 
successful implementation of the Novo Mercado and is constantly climbing 
the ladder of prosperity. 
 
Also the MICEX, Russia’s most important stock exchange, started to make 
some effort in improving its corporate behavior. It also offers some different 
quotation lists to choose from to companies, who want to issue their shares. 
They vary in requirements but are still not comparable with the Brazilian ones. 
Preferred shares are still allowed even in the highest list and also 
transparency standards lie behind those of many other emerging economies. 
Russia being the world’s number one producer of natural gas and oil128, its 
stock exchange is led by energy blue chips like Gazprom or Rosneft, who 
boost the market capitalization to one of the ten biggest amounts worldwide. 
Being dependent on the activity of a few powerful oligarchs, it is not easy to 
implement new systems that might seem unnecessary to them. Their support 
is essential. MICEX already created two other segments that feature special 
requirements: the sector of innovative and growing companies (IGC) and the 
Market for Innovations and Investments. For companies who want to be active 
                                            
128 The World Factbook (2009), www.cia.gov 
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in one of them, corporate governance requirements, like the transparency 
standard, already exceed those of the traditional market. This is a good 
beginning. The next important step is to expand the higher standards to a 
wider range of segments. The more companies can be attracted, the more 
likely is it that also stock exchange giants adopt the new system. I think, like in 
Brazil, it would be helpful to have the support of some state institutions to 
convince them.  
 
For me, the Brazilian as well as the Russian capital markets have the 
potential to be among the most interesting global investment themes if they 
develop according to the rising demands of corporate governance. They have 
the resources and preconditions to become leading economies within the next 
50 years. Now it remains to be seen what the future holds and how these two 
countries will make use of their opportunities. 
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ANHANG 
Abstract 
 
Im Laufe der letzten Jahrzehnte stieg das Interesse an Corporate Governance 
rasant an. In Kapitalmärkten weltweit ist das Thema rund um die Corporate 
Governance Mittelpunkt vieler Diskussionen geworden. Eine gute, 
verantwortungsvolle und zielgerichtete Führung von Unternehmen wird 
angestrebt und gefordert. Bilanzskandale in internationalen Unternehmen, 
Milliardendefizite amerikanischer Investitionsbanken in 2007 und 2008 und 
die Präsenz von exzessiven Managementgehältern haben viel Missvertrauen 
und Zweifel gegenüber der Organisation des Privatsektors hervorgerufen. 
Dadurch werden immer höhere Anforderungen an die Transparenz von 
Unternehmenshandlungen und die Rücksichtnahme von Aktionärsinteressen 
gestellt. Die größte Bedeutung hat diese Veränderung für börsennotierte 
Unternehmen. Vor allem in Schwellenländern wie Brasilien und Russland, wo 
es oft nur wenige Gesetze zum Schutz der Aktionäre gibt und das 
Rechtssystem tendenziell schwach entwickelt ist, ist eine gute Corporate 
Governance unverzichtbar geworden. Studien haben gezeigt, dass effiziente 
Corporate Governance einen wesentlichen Beitrag zur Stabilität am 
Finanzmarkt und zum Wirtschaftswachstum leistet. 
 
Im Rahmen dieser Arbeit wird erst die Theorie der Corporate Governance 
behandelt und anschließend dessen Erscheinung innerhalb des 
brasilianischen und des russischen Kapitalmarktes analysiert. Die 
Entwicklungen der Börsen werden miteinander verglichen und deren 
Unterschiede und Gemeinsamkeiten heraus gearbeitet. Brasiliens Bovespa 
hat mit der Einführung seines Novo Mercados, einem speziellen Corporate 
Governance Segmentes, bewiesen, dass auch in einem Land mit einem 
schwachen Rechtssystem ein hoher Aktionärsschutz und hohe 
Transparenznormen geltend gemacht werden können. Brasilien zeigt damit, 
dass ein Schwellenland durchaus im internationalen Wettbewerb mithalten 
kann. Nun wirft sich aber die Frage auf, ob dieser innovative Ansatz auch in 
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Russland, einem Land geprägt von machtvollen, einflussreichen Oligarchen 
und einem hohen Grade an Korruption, erfolgreich eingeführt werden könnte? 
Um dies beantworten zu können muss differenziert werden. Die Idee, eine 
sicherere Umwelt für Aktionäre und andere relevante Akteure zu schaffen, ist 
immer und überall sinnvoll anwendbar. Allerdings kann das Konzept des Novo 
Mercado nicht universell angewendet werden sondern muss stets an die 
lokalen Gegebenheiten angepasst werden. 
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